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We repeat estimation IV 7.2 without these three countries. The results in Table 16 show that the price coefficient is indeed higher (and still highly significant) with the smaller sample. However, given the relatively small difference in the two price coefficients compared to their standard errors , there is no clear evidence against the consistency of the main estimates from IV 7.2.
B. Construction of the hypothetical excise taxes
In section IV.B.1 of the text, a hypothetical excise tax is used as an instrument for cigarette prices. Here we describe how that variable, ExTaxHypo (or ℎ as it is denoted here), is constructed. We begin with the following identities:
In the expression, h superscripts are for hypothetical quantities. ℎ is the tax-included retail sales price (TIRSP) with the hypothetical tax, 0 ℎ is the pre-excise-tax base price to be used in constructing the hypothetical tax, and ℎ is the hypothetical overall excise tax (i.e., the sum of the specific and ad valorem excise taxes). In equation (A-2), is the actual amount-specific excise tax (taken to be exogenous, thus also used for the hypothetical tax) and ℎ is the hypothetical ad valorem excise tax amount (not the rate). The actual ad valorem tax amount cannot be used since it was calculated from a base that was presumed to be endogenous.
To calculate ℎ , define α to be the ad valorem excise tax rate as a percentage of TIRSP. Rate α is taken to be constant for a country and year, even though the actual base from which the ad valorem tax is calculated may differ from country to country. Treating the ad valorem tax as a fraction of TIRSP may appear odd, since TIRSP itself includes excise taxes, but we do this for two reasons. It matches how the tax data are presented in both the Euromonitor and the alternative European Commission data (discussed in a later section of the appendix), as a fraction of TIRSP. Also, EU law requires minimum Then, from (A-1), (A-2), and by definition of α, we have
or, after rearranging terms,
Combining (A-1) and (A-4) and rearranging terms yields the final expression for ExTaxHypo it :
Matching to the data described in the text, is SpecTax it and is AVtax it , both given in the Euromonitor data. The base price 0 ℎ , which is required to be plausibly exogenous since ExTaxHypo it will be used as an instrument, remains to be chosen. Define 0 to be the actual TIRSP less the overall actual excise tax (i.e., 0 = CigPrice it − ExTax it ). Then we choose 0 ℎ for all observations to be the average value of 0 in the sample. Since the result does not vary over time, it cannot be endogenous due to timevarying factors affecting actual prices. Since 0 ℎ does not vary across countries, it cannot be correlated with endogenous country-specific factors. Instrument ExTaxHypo it varies over time and country because both and α vary over both.
C. A consumption gap analysis of illicit trade
To complement the main estimations using the Euromonitor estimates of IRTC, we also calculated our own estimates of illicit market share. The consumption gap analysis in this section By definition, equals , the number of smokers in the country, times , the average smoking intensity. While can be reasonably well estimated from survey data, it is well known that is likely to be underreported (as ̃) by survey respondents (Warner, 1978; Merriman, 2000) . Assume that underreporting is by a constant multiple 0 < < 1, so that estimated consumption ignoring the misreporting is � =̃ but that actual consumption is
Rearranging the terms in equation (A-6) yields
and so the illicit market share / , denoted , is
Assume a linear fixed-effects regression model for , so that
Equating the right sides of equations (A-8) and (A-9), we have:
Define to be / � and let ̈ represent a variable that has been demeaned by the within transformation: ̈= − 1 ∑ =1 . Then equation (A-10) after transformation becomes:
where the new error term is a mean-zero function of the terms in the final parentheses on the right side of equation (A-11) for all periods.
If the original error was strictly exogenous in equation (A-9), and there is either no net foreign legal supply ( = 0) or it is also strictly exogenous, then is exogenous in equation (A-12). However, if cigarette price is an element of , it is likely correlated with through the term / � . When licit prices rises within the country, then may rise (as consumers obtain more cigarettes abroad and foreigners buy fewer cigarettes within the country) and � may fall (since demand is responsive to price). Since / � enters negatively, price and the error term are therefore negatively correlated, and we thus expect there to be downward bias on the estimated coefficient − / on price in equation (A-11). The bias thus would exaggerate the estimate of , the causal impact of price on actual IRTC.
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Conceptually, the bias occurs because part of the impact on observed "illicit trade", as defined by the method above, will actually be increasing net foreign legal supply.
There are three potential responses to this potential bias. The first would be to ignore it, as appears to have been done in previous literature (e.g., Blecher, 2010). The second would be to gather data on net foreign legal supply, so that could be moved out of the error term . Since the only consistently calculated estimates of which we are aware for the EU during our entire period are those from KPMG in the Project Star reports, we do not follow this approach, since we wish to avoid using KPMG data where possible in this estimation. The third response, which we adopt, is to recognize the issue but argue that the results are illustrative nonetheless. The KPMG data indicate that foreign legal supply from border-crossing by consumers happens, as shown in Figure 10 , where it is labeled "nondomestic legal". However, the figure also shows that it is a minor part of overall trade, more stable than illicit trade, and less responsive to price changes. Figure 11 . The scatterplot shows that there is very high correlation between the two estimates (0.98). The slope of the line of best fit for the logged data, from estimation OLS 17.1 in the first column of Table 17 , is close to one, as it must be if equation (A-2) is correct. 55 The implied value of from the regression is 0.63.
56
Thus, for every 10 cigarettes apparently actually consumed, smokers claim on average to have smoked only 6.3.
The results of estimation of equation (A-7), with and without using KPMG data on domestic consumption, are in second and following columns of Table 17 . The dependent variable in the first 52 Empty pack surveys are based on a large sample of packs collected via formal sampling plans in various cities throughout the countries. Once packs are collected, they are examined to determine the proportion of packs that did not originate domestically. 53 Eurobarometer surveys are available covering data from 1995, 2002, 2005, 2006, 2008, 2009, 2012, and 2014. 54 Each country was allowed to have its own set of location and scale parameters for the lognormal distribution. 55 The estimated slope of the line is 1.03, with 95% confidence interval spanning one [0.961,1.097].
A-8 equation is constructed using domestic licit sales data from Euromonitor for . Estimation WI-OLS 17.1 (WI for within-transformed data) returns estimates of / from OLS estimation on the pooled, demeaned data. The estimate-to-scale of the impact of cigarette price on illicit share is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. Estimation WI-OLS 17.2 is similar except that year fixed effects are accounted for; the estimate-to-scale of the impact of price on illicit share is now significant at the 1% level. These results bolster the main conclusions of the paper, namely that price increases spur illicit trade, without indicating the magnitude of the marginal effect. However, if the previous estimate of (from estimation OLS 17.1) is employed, the implied estimates of (the elasticity of illicit market share with respect to licit cigarette price) from estimations WI-OLS 17.1 and 17.2 are 0.30 and 0.47, respectively. These estimates are higher than the elasticities found from the fixed-effects estimates reported in Table 7 (perhaps due to the bias discussed above).
The final two columns of Table 17 contains Table 7 . The estimates of are quite close to those from estimation OLS 17.1, and are significant at the 5% level. 58 In summary, the work here using the consumption gap analysis corroborates the finding in the paper that increasing the licit price of cigarettes (e.g., through taxation) has sizeable and statistically significant impacts on IRTC.
57 Estimation is with the nlsur command in Stata 14.1.
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D. Alternative data for prices and taxes
The European Commission produces annual reports on cigarettes prices and taxes. 59 Through 2010, the reported price is for the most popular price category (MPPC; i.e., the average price of the modal type of cigarette sold, usually king-size filter brands). After that year, weighted-average price (WAP; i.e., average revenue for cigarettes) is reported. The variables are converted to real terms using the same method as for all nominal data. Inclusion of year fixed effects in the estimations mitigates any impacts of this discontinuity in the time series. Tax data are also reported, as in the Euromonitor data:
ad valorem and specific excise taxes, along with the VAT rate (expressed as a percentage of tax-included retail sales price, TIRSP). There is a high degree of concordance between the European Commission and the Euromonitor data. Log prices from the two sources exhibit correlation of 0.97. The instruments
ExTaxHypo from equation (1) constructed from the EC and EM sources has correlation of 0.92. The VAT rates from the two sources have correlation of 0.97. Given these high correlations, the similarity of the new results in Table 12 with those in Table 7 is not surprising.
E. Alternative measures of corruption and governance
The estimations in Table 13 and Table 14 Data from the United Nations on total police personnel at the national level per 100,000 people are taken from UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). 63 The counts include personnel in public 61 See info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/rl.pdf. 62 While the government effectiveness index may appear to be less germane to IRTC than the other corruption and governance measures, we included it because Melzer (2010) found it to be significant in some of her crosssectional regressions of illicit cigarette consumption share. 63 See unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/United-Nations-Surveys-on-Crime-Trends-and-the-Operations-ofCriminal-Justice-Systems.html. Consumption estimated from Eurobarometer survey data (million sticks, log) 6 8 10 12 Total consumption, KPMG estimate (million sticks, log)
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